mechanistic type is quite out of fashion, it is in order to mention that Prof. Hogben has been appointed in quick succession to two of the most important chairs of biology in the British Empire. If we ask, Does he merely present again in defence of his Modern Materialism just the same arguments and the same empirical facts as were held by his forerunners of the nineteenth century to clinch the case for mechanical biology ? the answer is, No, not entirely ; there is some slight novelty of reasoning and some addition to the mass of experimental data adduced in support. Yet also much of the old type of argument by aspersion is put forward as polemic against all other views. The views of such men as Henri Bergson, A. N. Whitehead, and the late J. S. Haldane are lightly pushed aside by the damning application to them of such epithets as metaphysics, teleology, organicism, holism, ethical prejudices, and, especially and most frequently, [1] introspective philosophy'.

Hogben proposes to put in place of the old question, Which is true, Mechanism or Vitaliam ? the question, Is the logical structure of biological inquiry essentially similar to that of physical science ? One may doubt whether comparative inquiries into the logical structures of different inquiries are likely to yield very clear-cut conclusions. But, if it be accepted that inquiries into logical structures of the inquiries are to settle this great question of the nature of living things, it must be insisted that the question in dispute is not, Are the logical structures of biological and physical inquiry

essentially similar ?
but rather, Should they be essentially similar ? To this question the mechanists incline to say Yes; and the non-mechanists to say No. Yet either answer would leave in the field a number of very different theories. It